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Abstract
The question of whether a majoritarian setup is optimal in terms of broad representation takes up on
paramount importance in the context of power-sharing in deeply divided places, whereby unqualified
exclusion of segment(s) of the population from government can have potentially disastrous
consequences. Governance in deeply-divided places presents a rather intriguing question --- who governs
the people, how are they elected, what mandates do they have? What form of government works best - a
single-party majoritarian system that by popular belief leads to more effective governance or a
consensus-based government that allows for better protection of minority interests? More broadly then, is
inclusion and participation in government more important in present-day deeply-divided societies than
effective and efficient governance? These questions have attracted a lot of attention in the field of
consensual democracy as theorists evaluate the possible trade-off between effective governance and
broad participation. Proponents of majoritarianism tend to argue that coalition governments lead to
ineffectual governance as compromise and negotiation become key. But does this argument work in
deeply-divided societies where exclusion from government can lead to biased and potentially disastrous,
flawed policies? This paper evaluates the impact of the form of government (single-party versus coalition
cabinet) at the sub-national level in the context of Indian provinces by studying state performance through
four lenses, namely, economic growth, social sector expenditure, number of Hindu-Muslim riots, and
number of crimes committed against Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SC/ST). By running
multivariate panel regressions on data from fifteen Indian states over a thirty year time period
(1981-2010), it argues that majoritarian governments do not outperform consensual governments on
measures of economic growth and civil peace. Instead, it appears that multi-party coalition governments
in the context of Indian provinces have had a favorable impact on key aspects of democracy. Perhaps,
coalition governments do provide the best of both worlds in deeply-divided societies.
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“Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the
friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are
too unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that
measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor
party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority” (Federalist 10,
1787).
More than two hundred years ago, the venerable James Madison in the course of arguing
for the merits of the newly-formed United States Constitution noted a fundamental peril in the
rubric of majoritarian democracies – the notion that a tyrannizing majority would effectively
govern without keeping in mind the interests of the minority. As he duly stated, citizens were
indeed skeptical about the inclusionary tendencies of an all-powerful government comprising
solely of the “overbearing majority” that had no incentive to appease the minority. Over the
years, this aspect of majoritarian systems has attracted enormous attention from theorists and
practitioners in their quest for what constitutes an ideal democracy. After all, as Arend Lijphart
(2012) argues, if democracy is defined as “government by and for the people”, it behooves us to
ask “who will do the governing and to whose interests should the government be responsive
when the people are in disagreement and have divergent preferences?” (p. 1). Furthermore, is a
government really “for all the people” if it is simply constituted of the majority and excludes the
minorities? This question of whether a majoritarian setup is optimal in terms of broad
representation takes up on paramount importance in the context of power-sharing in deeplydivided societies whereby unqualified exclusion of segment(s) of the population from
government can have potentially disastrous consequences. In fact, there have been several cases
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throughout the history of democracy whereby instituting a majoritarian government, typically
characterized by the concentration of executive power in single-party majority cabinets, has
insinuated violent reactions from the “excluded”. This represents a rather intuitive outcome in
places like, Nigeria and Iraq for example, where the populations are deeply divided across ethnic
cleavages and a pure majority government formed by a single-party representing one of the
ethnicities can easily incite the rest out of fears of exclusion and potentially biased and harmful
policy-making.
An alternative prescription then to the majoritarian setup that has been put forth, both in
theory and practice, is a consensual system of government whereby executive power is typically
shared in broad multi-party coalitions. As Lijphart (1999) notes, “its [consensus model] rules and
institutions aim at broad participation in government and broad agreement on the policies that the
government should pursue…[it] tries to share, disperse, and limit power in a variety of
ways…and is characterized by inclusiveness, bargaining, and compromise” (p. 2). This form of
government, therefore, provides broader participation and a more accurate representation of the
population in government potentially allowing for better protection of minority interests and
alleviating the likelihood of the “tyranny of the majority”. In fact, in the context of deeplydivided places, this would appear to be a rather pleasant outcome whereby political parties
representing different ethnicities would come together to form coalition governments, hence,
ensuring broader representation of interests and minimal exclusion.
However, government is not simply about inclusion and participation; instead, one could
argue that it is primarily about efficient and effective governance and how well the democracy
functions. Notwithstanding the form of government in place, what really counts is how the state
performs in the context of economic and social welfare outcomes. As Samuel Beer (1998) aptly
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notes, “representative government must not only represent, it must also govern” (p. 25). Hence,
the system of government prescribed ought not to be one that solely ensures broad and fair
representation, but rather one that concurrently optimizes the performance of the state on
measures such as economic growth, control of violence, alleviation of poverty and inequality,
social sector expenditure, etc. This raises the question then of whether majoritarian governments,
albeit not ideally representative, provide a more efficient form of governance vis-à-vis consensus
governments. Perhaps it is the case that single-party majoritarian governments are best-suited for
effective and decisive policy-making. In fact, Lowell (1896) asserted that “the larger the number
of discordant groups…the more feeble and unstable the position of the cabinet” (Lijphart 1999,
p. 64). Said differently, Lowell’s axiom states that multi-party coalition cabinets with their
instability and inability to take strong decisions are not well-suited to effective policy-making.
After all, conventional wisdom would have us believe that single-party cabinets are more
effectual and decisive than multi-party cabinets that may be plagued by incessant negotiations
and weak policy outcomes arising from a lack of compromise. This paper then focuses on this
very question of whether single-party majoritarian systems do indeed provide better outcomes in
terms of governance based on aforementioned measures. While single-party cabinets, especially
in the context of deeply-divided societies, are not ideal for more accurate representation,
participation, and protection of minority interests, do they compensate by providing better
outcomes than multi-party cabinets on measures of economic growth, control of violence, and
social welfare? Or, might it even be the case that consensus governments comprised of stable
coalitions provide better social welfare and economic outcomes resulting from more coherent
and widely-accepted centrist policies? This paper evaluates the impact of the form of
government (single-party versus coalition cabinet) at the sub-national level in the context of
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Indian provinces by studying state performance through four lenses, namely, economic growth,
social sector expenditure, number of Hindu-Muslim riots, and number of crimes committed
against Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SC/ST). By running multivariate panel
regressions on data from fifteen Indian states over a thirty year time period (1981-2010), this
paper argues that majoritarian governments do not outperform consensual governments on
measures of economic growth and civil peace. Instead, it appears that multi-party coalition
governments in the context of Indian provinces have had a favorable impact on key aspects of
democracy. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we provide a brief
review of the existing literature on the impact of majoritarian versus consensual governments on
economic, civil peace, and social welfare outcomes at the national level. Section III, then,
provides an overview of the fundamental features of Indian state politics and delineates the state
governments in the sample as single-party governments or multi-party coalitions over time. Next,
in Section IV, we present our arguments, hypotheses, and results from our four regression
models, one each for economic growth, social sector expenditure, number of Hindu-Muslim
riots, and number of crimes committed against Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SC/ST).
Finally, in section V, we draw broad-based conclusions from this empirical investigation and
situate the results in the context of the larger debate between majoritarian and consensual
systems.

2231CB5D6E596D1FDBD1
As the theoretical debate about the merits and flaws of majoritarian versus consensus democracy
rages on, the empirical question of whether the form of government has a significant impact on
the performance of states becomes crucial. This issue of whether the divergence in economic,
civil peace and social welfare outcomes between majoritarian and consensus democracies is
52
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attributable to the form of government in place has been widely studied at the national level. The
existing literature, akin to the empirical evidence, provides mixed answers on several different
measures. Rose (1992) finds no significant impact of the form of federal government
(majoritarian versus consensus) on economic growth, unemployment, and inflation, while
Crepaz (1996) argues that consensual governments do actually have a significantly positive
impact on inflation and unemployment among OECD countries. Roubini and Sachs (1989)
demonstrate that multi-party coalition governments run larger budget deficits, noting that
individual coalition partners with distinct electoral bases and interests make it extremely difficult
to find issues which all members agree to cut expenses on. Concurrently, they point out that if
the coalition government in place is contingent on the existence of the alliance, i.e., if one of the
coalition parties walks away the government breaks down, then it increases the possibility of
lock-jam and ineffectual policy-making in the light of incessant appeasement and compromise.
In contrast, Echeverri-Gent (1998) in his study of coalition governments in India at the federal
level argues that consensual governments have actually undertaken bolder reform measures and
fared better than single-party governments. Lalvani (2005) attempts to explain this result by
stating that a “fear of losing power could in fact be considered the biggest strength of a weak
coalition” (p. 131). In other words, if a coalition government is in place with a slim electoral
majority, members of the alliance try harder to get things done and take the measures needed to
ensure that no party walks away. The fear of the government breaking down and consequently,
losing power, ensures perhaps paradoxically that coalition members bridge their differences and
shape effectual, centrist, and decisive policies. On the other hand, if a single-party government is
in place with a large majority, it might not be as hard-pressed to take tough decisions and pass
the requisite reforms given its comfortable control of power. In the context of civil peace, Powell
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(1981) indicates that consensus democracies control violence better than majoritarian systems
stating that “representational systems…performed very well on the riot measures” (p. 876).
Finally, Lijphart (1999) in his study of thirty countries argues that “consensus democracies have
a better performance record than majoritarian democracies, especially with regard to the control
of inflation but also, albeit much more weakly, with regard to most of the other macroeconomic
performance variables and the control of violence” (p. 274). Importantly, however, he notes that
his results are not statistically significant when control variables and outliers are taken into
account, and hence, his overarching conclusion instead is that “majoritarian democracies are
clearly not superior to consensus democracies in managing the economy and in maintaining civil
peace” (p. 274). This conclusion is mainly drawn to refute the notion that consensus
governments, unlike majoritarian ones, are perennially at the negotiation table resulting in weak
policy outcomes and indecisiveness. Instead, it might even be the case that due to various
reasons, consensual governments actually have a significantly favorable impact on state
performance vis-à-vis single-part majoritarian systems. In this paper, we study this question by
applying robust statistical analysis at the sub-national level by looking at the performance of
Indian provinces on key economic, social welfare, and civil peace measures. The following
sections outline key features and results of our empirical study.

22231248BE415E5D17B5BA1
Post-independence in 1947, the Indian political arena was dominated by the Indian National
Congress (INC) both at the federal and state level. This one-party dominant system existed for
nearly two decades at the state level and for three decades at the federal level with the INC
forming single-party majoritarian governments across the country. However, given the
organization of Indian provinces along linguistic cleavages, several state and regional parties
72
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began to emerge appealing to issues pertaining specifically to their states. The first coalition
government at the state level was then formed in 1967 simultaneously across multiple states,
while the first coalition government at the federal level was formed after the 1977 elections. In
the course of the following years, the country has seen several coalition governments both at the
state and federal level, leading us to the question of whether divergences in state performance are
attributable to differences in the form of government. At the very outset, it was critical for our
study to classify provincial governments as single-party or coalition. Moreover, we further
categorized coalition governments into electoral and non-electoral coalitions, whereby an
electoral coalition was defined as one that was formed in order to gain a majority in the State
Legislative Assembly and a non-electoral coalition was defined as one that was formed due to
reasons besides seeking a majority. In other words, if a state government was formed out of an
alliance of two or more parties that had won a majority of the seats as a coalition, the state
government was classified as an electoral coalition. That implied that if one or more members of
the alliance left the coalition, the government would break down as no party had an outright
majority. In contrast, a non-electoral coalition government included the party that had the
dominant majority of seats (and could hence, still stay in power if the alliance broke down)
alongside one or more other parties. In other words, a non-electoral coalition represents those
state governments where parties formed an alliance not to form the government but rather for
other reasons. We make this distinction in our study because arguably electoral and non-electoral
coalition governments have different sets of incentives. An electoral coalition could possibly
need more negotiation and compromise in order to ensure that no party walks away leading to
potentially different outcomes from a non-electoral coalition where the dominant member of the
coalition is not worried about losing power. It also speaks to the different incentives of the
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parties within the non-electoral coalition whereby the minority party within the coalition without
a power-veto would be more comprising in order to ensure its stay in power. Therefore, for the
purpose of our study, state governments in India were classified into three groups – i) Singleparty, ii) Electoral coalition, and iii) Non-electoral coalition.
In order to initially denote the form of state governments in place, we looked at the State
Legislative Assembly Election results for fifteen states over thirty years from 1981 to 2010, for a
total of 450 observations.1 The fifteen states chosen for the purpose of this paper were Andhra
Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra,
Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. State Legislative
Assembly election outcomes in India are determined by a majority system whereby the party that
wins more than 50% of the seats is invited to form the state government. The states chosen in our
sample have all experienced competitive Legislative Assembly elections in the period in question
seeing at least two, but typically more than two parties, fielding candidates. At this point, it is
important to keep in mind that besides the three quintessentially national parties (Indian National
Congress, Bharatiya Janata Party, and Communist Party of India), the several regional and state
parties in existence typically substantially influence state elections. For example, in the state of
Orissa, Biju Janata Dal (BJD) is an important state party that has performed considerably well
over the last decade or so. In essence, therefore, national parties aforementioned when competing
in state elections either contest by themselves or form an alliance with one or more of the state
parties. It might even be the case that none of the national parties hold much sway in a given
state allowing the state parties to gain a majority and form the government by themselves. For
our paper, we looked at the election results and the form of state government that was established
2222222222222222222222222222222222222222 2222222222222222222
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after each election for all fifteen states from 1980 to 2010. If a single party won a majority of the
seats and formed the government by itself, the state government was coded as “Single”.
However, if none of the parties individually won a majority of the seats but instead an alliance of
parties together gained more than 50% of the seats and formed the government, the state
government was coded as “Electoral”. Finally, if a single party even after winning a majority of
the seats formed the government in an alliance with one or more other parties, the state
government was coded as non-electoral. (Table I shows the classification of state governments in
the sample from 1981-2010).
Hence, what we are really attempting to isolate is whether states that experienced such
coalition governments (electoral or non-electoral) outperformed states that elected single-party
governments. For the purpose of this paper, we built four multivariate regression models to
isolate the impact of the form of government on four distinct dependent variables, namely,
economic growth, social sector expenditure, number of Hindu-Muslim riots, and number of
crimes committed against Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SC/ST). In the following
section, we present our four models and the results that were generated.
Table I: Form of Government by State - Single/Electoral/Non-Electoral (1981-2010)
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23131A747BA16751E481761717D64D451
In order to evaluate whether the divergence in economic performance across Indian states was
attributable to the form of government in place (single/electoral/non-electoral), we built a
multivariate regression model with the following specifications. Our dependent variable that we
used as a proxy for economic performance was growth in annual net state per capita income from
1981-2010.2 All income figures were re-based at 2004-2005 levels in order to allow for
meaningful comparisons across state and time over thirty years. Our major explanatory variable
– form of government – was coded in the form of two dummy variables, given that the form of
government can be one of three options (single/electoral/non-electoral). Hence, we used the (k-1)
dummy variable specification with the presence of the intercept term in our regression. Our two
dummy variables were “Electoral Coalition” and “Non-Electoral Coalition”, whereby both were
switched off if the state government in place was a single-party government and one switched on
if a multi-party coalition government was in place (depending on whether it was electoral or nonelectoral). In our base one model, we included the two dummy variables as explanatory variables
and added Log (Population) as a control variable. The control variable was added to control for
the differing population sizes across the sample of states and given that the Census occurs every
ten years, we used population figures from 1991 for the first half of our dataset and population
figures from 2001 for the second half.3 Hence, the population variable is time invariant in our
regression.
The results from our first base model show that having an electoral coalition government
increases growth by 0.63% (statistically significant) while having a non-electoral coalition
2222222222222222222222222222222222222222 2222222222222222222
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increases growth by 0.28%. It is important to keep in mind that the base case in our model is a
single-party government and therefore, the coefficients of our regression denote the change in
growth when either one of the dummy variables for electoral and non-electoral coalition switches
on (Refer to Table II for results from this model). Next, in our base two model, we include
national per capita income growth as a control variable. This was done in order to control for
nationwide growth shocks over time, i.e., to isolate state economic growth effects from spillovers
of national growth. In other words, this control variable converts our base one model into a
quasi-time fixed effects model whereby the effects of nationwide economic growth over time on
state economic performance is controlled for. Our base two model results show that having an
electoral coalition increases growth by 0.19% and having a non-electoral coalition increases
growth by 0.26%.
In our third model specification, we included only two explanatory variables - the two
dummy variables for electoral and non-electoral coalition and added state fixed-effects in order
to isolate intertemporal variation in growth over time. In other words, adding state fixed-effects
to our panel data allowed us to focus on the determinants of economic growth within each state
over time.4 Our results indicate that having an electoral coalition government increases growth
by 0.91% (statistically significant) while having a non-electoral coalition government decreases
growth by 0.06%. Finally, we ran our model with state and time fixed effects to basically regress
each data point in our sample. Our results show having an electoral coalition government
increases growth by 0.47% while having a non-electoral coalition government increases growth
by 0.15%.
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Table II: Economic Growth and Form of Government (Sample = 15 states)

Therefore, it is clear from our model that states with majoritarian governments at the provincial
level in India do not outperform states with coalition governments. Instead, it appears that having
a coalition government in place might actually have a positive impact on economic growth in
Indian states. This is of course not a statistically significant result across all our model
specifications but the direction of change appears to be rather clear. Hence, our results align with
Lijphart’s (1999) conclusions that consensual governments do not underperform majoritarian
governments on measures of economic growth, while simultaneously providing broader
representation. (Figure I shows how each state in our sample has performed on average in terms
of economic growth and Figure II denotes how the states have performed on aggregate over time
in the context of the form of government in place).5
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Figure I: State-wise Coalition Government and Growth (1981-2010)

Figure II: Average Income Growth and Coalition Government (average across sample n=15)
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In our second model, we looked at whether the amount of social sector expenditure made by
each state over time is dependent on the form of government in place. Social sector expenditure
includes all expenditure on social services, rural development, food storage, warehousing, capital
outlays, loans and advances made by state governments. We built a similar multivariate
regression model to the one mentioned above with the following specifications. Our dependent
variable was the amount of social sector expenditure made by each state in billions of rupees
from 2000-2010.6 Our major explanatory variable – form of government – was coded in the form
of two dummy variables, “Electoral” and “Non-Electoral”, exactly like in the previous model.
In our base one model, in addition to our two dummy variables, we added two control
variables – Net State Domestic Product (NSDP) and Log (Population). Net State Domestic
Product was added to control for the level of wealth in each state, i.e., to control for the fact that
wealthier states simply have more money for social sector expenditure than less well-off states.7
All NSDP numbers were re-based at 2004-2005 levels to allow for meaningful comparison
across state and time. Log (Population), as before, was added to control for the differing
population sizes across the sample of states (2001 Census) and was time-invariant in our model.
Our results from our base one model interestingly show that having an electoral or non-electoral
coalition government significantly reduces the level of social sector expenditure (statistically
significant) while controlling for other variables (Refer to Table III for results from this model).
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Adding time and state fixed effects to our base one model changed the coefficient marginally but
the results mostly remained statistically significant.8
Table III: Social Sector Expenditure and Form of Government (Sample = 15 states)

This result indicates that single-party governments actually tend to have higher social
sector expenditure than multi-party governments at the provincial level in India. This is in stark
contrast to the conventional wisdom that would have us believe that coalition governments
formed from parties with different electoral bases would spend more rather than less to satisfy all
the different constituents. Referring to an earlier discussion of coalition governments
experiencing larger budget deficits (Roubini and Sachs, 1989), it would appear that if there was
an alliance between the BJP and a state party, for example, the state party with its more local
electoral base would want to spend more on the social sector in order to gain the support of state
citizens and get re-elected. We hypothesize, however, by looking at the results that coalition
governments having already secured the support of a broader electorate might pay less attention
to social welfare than a single-party majoritarian cabinet aiming to gain the support of other
groups through higher social sector expenditure. Therefore, the results from our model show that
22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
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the divergence in social sector expenditure across states in India is indeed partly attributable to
differences in the form of government and it appears that states that have instituted single-party
governments have, on average, seen higher social sector expenditure than those with multi-party
coalition governments. (Figure III shows how each state in our sample has performed on average
in terms of social sector expenditure growth and Figure IV denotes how the states have
performed on aggregate over time in the context of the form of government in place).9
Figure III: Average Growth in Social Sector Expenditure and Coalition Government

22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
9

2#2EF2E2((C22F2CC*C/2ED2F22DEE2F*2EC$2

A92
2

Figure IV: Average Social Sector Expenditure as Percentage of Net State Domestic Product and
Coalition Government (average across sample n = 15)
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In our third model, we looked at whether the number of Hindu-Muslim riots in Indian provinces
was affected by the form of government in place. We built a similar multivariate regression
model to the ones mentioned above with the following specifications. Our dependent variable
was the number of Hindu-Muslim riots in each state from 1981-1995.10 Importantly, we
excluded Orissa and Punjab from this model as outliers given their extremely low Muslim
population and absence of riots. Our major explanatory variable – form of government – was
coded in the form of two dummy variables, “Electoral” and “Non-Electoral”, exactly like in the
previous models.
22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
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In our base one model, in addition to our two dummy variables, we added four control
variables – Number of Riots (t-1), Percent Muslims, Log (Population), and Percent Literate.
Number of Riots (t-1) was added as a lagged dependent variable to control for the effects of riots
spilling over from one year to the next. As Bohlken and Sergenti (2010) note citing Posen
(1993), “riots may also follow previous riots as each riot strengthens existing fears and hatred
and creates new desires for revenge, leading to a vicious cycle of continual rioting” (p. 595).
Percent Muslims was included as a demographic control as different states have different
proportions of Muslim populations which could potentially influence the number of riots.11 We
include Log (Population) again akin to the previous two models, while we also add Percent
Literate as a control variable to account for the possibility that states with higher literacy and
better socio-economic conditions might experience lower ethnic violence.12 Percent Muslims,
Log (Population), and Percent Literate are time-invariant variables in our sample given the
Census occurs every ten years.
Our results from our base one model show that having a coalition government (electoral
or non-electoral) marginally reduces the number of Hindu-Muslim riots (Refer to Table IV for
results from this model). In our base two model, we add another control variable – state per
capita income growth – to account for the possibility that states performing better economically
might experience lower ethnic violence (Bohlken and Sergenti (2010) prove this relationship).
The results from our model stay nearly the same with growth indeed having a statistically
significant negative impact on the number of riots, a result that aligns with what Bohlken and
Sergenti (2010) demonstrated. In our base three model, we add the number of riots nationwide as
another control variable in order to account for nationwide shocks over time such as the
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Ayodhya incident of the early 1990s. In other words, this control variable converts our base two
model into a quasi-time fixed effects model whereby the effects of national agitation between
Hindus and Muslims over time on the number of state riots is controlled for. Our base three
model shows similar results as our base one and two models, except that the negative impact of
having a non-coalition government on the number of riots becomes statistically significant at the
5% level. Finally, we add state and time fixed effects to our model specifications and continue to
find that having an electoral or non-electoral coalition government marginally reduces the
number of Hindu-Muslim riots.13
Therefore, it is clear from our model that states with majoritarian governments at the
provincial level in India do not outperform states with coalition governments in the context of
controlling violence. Instead, it appears that having a coalition government in place might
actually have a positive impact on controlling Hindu-Muslim riots in Indian states. This is of
course not a statistically significant result across all our model specifications but the direction of
change appears to be rather clear. This result aligns with the conventional notion that minority
interests, or in this case, minorities themselves, are better protected under consensual
government systems. Hence, our results from this model also align with Lijphart’s (1999)
conclusions that consensual governments do not underperform majoritarian governments on
measures of controlling communal violence while simultaneously providing broader
representation. (Figure V shows how each state in our sample has performed on average in terms
of the number of riots and Figure VI denotes how the states have performed on aggregate over
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time in the context of the form of government in place. Figure VII shows the relationship
between growth and the number of riots state-wise).14
Table IV: Number of Hindu-Muslim Riots and Form of Government (Sample = 15 states)

Figure V: State-wise Coalition Government and Number of Hindu-Muslim Riots (1981-1995)
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Figure VI: Number of Riots and Coalition Government (sum across sample n=13)

Figure VII: Growth and Number of Hindu-Muslim Riots (1981-1995)
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In our fourth and final model, we looked at whether the number of crimes committed against
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SC/ST) in Indian provinces was affected by the form of
government in place. Conventional wisdom in this instance would have us believe that broader
representation and participation provided by consensual governments would result in better
protection of minorities, akin to the previous case. To test this hypothesis, we built a similar
multivariate regression model to the ones mentioned above with the following specifications.
Our dependent variable was the number of crimes committed against SC/ST in each state from
1997-2010.15 Importantly, our sample fell to 11 states as we excluded Punjab, West Bengal,
Haryana, and Assam as outliers. Our major explanatory variable – form of government – was
coded in the form of two dummy variables, “Electoral” and “Non-Electoral”, exactly like in the
previous models.
In our base one model, in addition to our two dummy variables, we added three control
variables – Percent SC/ST, Log (Population), and Percent Literate. Percent SC/ST was included
as a demographic control as different states have different proportions of SC/ST populations
which could potentially influence the number of crimes.16 We include Log (Population) again
akin to the previous three models, while we also add Percent Literate as a control variable to
account for the possibility that states with higher literacy and better socio-economic conditions
might experience lower crimes.17 Percent SC/ST, Log (Population), and Percent Literate are
time-invariant variables in our sample given the Census occurs every ten years.
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Our results from our base one model show that having a coalition government (electoral
or non-electoral) significantly reduces the number of crimes committed against SC/ST (Refer to
Table V for results from this model). In our base two model, we add another control variable –
state per capita income growth – to account for the possibility that states performing better
economically might experience lower crimes. The results from our model stay nearly the same
with our dummy variables for coalition governments still showing a significantly negative
impact on the number of crimes. In our base three model, we add the number of crimes
nationwide as another control variable in order to account for nationwide shocks over time. In
other words, this control variable converts our base two model into a quasi-time fixed effects
model whereby the effects of national agitation against SC/ST over time on the number of state
crimes is controlled for. Our base three model again shows similar results as our base one and
two models further demonstrating a robust statistical result. Finally, we add state and time fixed
effects to our model specifications and continue to find that having an electoral or non-electoral
coalition government reduces the number of crimes against SC/ST, although with the state and
time fixed effects in place, the coefficients drop significantly and become statistically
insignificant 18
Table V: Number of Crimes against SC/ST and Form of Government (Sample = 11 states)
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Therefore, it is clear from our model that states with majoritarian governments at the provincial
level in India do not outperform states with coalition governments in the context of controlling
crimes against minorities – a similar result as obtained from the previous model. Instead, it
appears that having a coalition government in place might actually have a positive impact on
controlling crimes against SC/ST in Indian states. This is of course not a statistically significant
result across all our model specifications but the direction of change appears to be rather
irrefutable. This result also aligns with the conventional notion that minority interests, or in this
case, minorities themselves, are better protected under consensual government systems. Hence,
our results from this model align with Lijphart’s (1999) conclusions that consensual governments
do not underperform majoritarian governments on measures of controlling communal violence,
while simultaneously providing broader representation. (Figure VIII shows how each state in our
sample has performed on average in terms of the number of crimes and Figure IX denotes how
the states have performed on aggregate over time in the context of the form of government in
place. Figure X shows the relationship between growth and the number of riots state-wise).19
Figure VIII: State-wise Coalition Government and Number of Crimes against SC/ST (19972010)
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Figure IX: No. of Crimes against SC/ST and Coalition Government (sum across sample n=11)

Figure X: Growth and Number of Crimes against SC/ST (1997-2010)
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Through our empirical study, it appears that we can definitively draw a negative conclusion
similar to Lijphart (1999) – single-party majoritarian governments do not outperform multi-party
consensus governments on measures of economic growth and control of violence. It appears,
therefore, that Lowell’s axiom which states that multi-party coalition cabinets are ill-suited for
effectual policy-making does not hold true in the context of Indian provinces. More importantly,
this empirical investigation helps us satisfy the aforementioned adage that representative
government must not only represent, it must also govern. Given that consensus governments
perform equally well, if not better, than majoritarian governments on different fronts, one can
convincingly make the argument that consensual systems provide more accurate representation
and broader participation without compromising on the quality of governance. Therefore, in
conclusion, this paper via an empirical investigation of sub-national India, prescribes the
formation of a consensual over a majoritarian government in deeply-divided societies.
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Table: List of states in sample (sorted by number of years of coalition government)

Table: List of states in sample (sorted by number of years of coalition government)
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Table: List of states in sample (sorted by number of years of coalition government)
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Figure: Crimes against SC/ST and Form of State Government – Andhra Pradesh2022
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Figure: Crimes against SC/ST and Form of State Government - Bihar1

1
Figure: Crimes against SC/ST and Form of State Government - Gujarat1

1

332
2

Figure: Crimes against SC/ST and Form of State Government - Karnataka1
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Figure: Crimes against SC/ST and Form of State Government - Kerala1
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Figure: Crimes against SC/ST and Form of State Government – Madhya Pradesh1
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Figure: Crimes against SC/ST and Form of State Government - Maharashtra1
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Figure: Crimes against SC/ST and Form of State Government - Orissa1
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Figure: Crimes against SC/ST and Form of State Government - Rajasthan1
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Figure: Crimes against SC/ST and Form of State Government – Tamil Nadu1
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Figure: Crimes against SC/ST and Form of State Government – Uttar Pradesh1
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Figure: Hindu-Muslim Riots and Form of State Government - Bihar1
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Figure: Hindu-Muslim Riots and Form of State Government - Gujarat1
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Figure: Hindu-Muslim Riots and Form of State Government - Karnataka1
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Figure: Hindu-Muslim Riots and Form of State Government - Kerala1
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Figure: Hindu-Muslim Riots and Form of State Government – Madhya Pradesh1
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Figure: Hindu-Muslim Riots and Form of State Government - Maharashtra1
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Figure: Hindu-Muslim Riots and Form of State Government - Rajasthan1
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Figure: Hindu-Muslim Riots and Form of State Government – Tamil Nadu1
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Figure: Hindu-Muslim Riots and Form of State Government – West Bengal1
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Figure: Hindu-Muslim Riots and Form of State Government – Uttar Pradesh1
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Figure: Hindu-Muslim Riots and Form of State Government - Assam1
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Figure: Per Capita Income Growth and Form of State Government – Andhra Pradesh1
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Figure: Per Capita Income Growth and Form of State Government – Bihar1
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Figure: Per Capita Income Growth and Form of State Government – Gujarat1
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Figure: Per Capita Income Growth and Form of State Government – Haryana1
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Figure: Per Capita Income Growth and Form of State Government – Karnataka1
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Figure: Per Capita Income Growth and Form of State Government – Kerala1
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Figure: Per Capita Income Growth and Form of State Government – Madhya Pradesh1
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Figure: Per Capita Income Growth and Form of State Government – Maharashtra1
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Figure: Per Capita Income Growth and Form of State Government – Orissa1
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Figure: Per Capita Income Growth and Form of State Government – Punjab1

1
Figure: Per Capita Income Growth and Form of State Government – Rajasthan1
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Figure: Per Capita Income Growth and Form of State Government – Tamil Nadu1
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Figure: Per Capita Income Growth and Form of State Government – West Bengal1
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Figure: Per Capita Income Growth and Form of State Government – Uttar Pradesh1
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Figure: Per Capita Income Growth and Form of State Government – Assam1
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Figure: Social Sector Expenditure as Percentage of Net State Domestic Income (NSDP) and
Form of Government – Andhra Pradesh (2000-2010)

Figure: Social Sector Expenditure as Percentage of Net State Domestic Income (NSDP) and
Form of Government – Bihar (2000-2010)
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Figure: Social Sector Expenditure as Percentage of Net State Domestic Income (NSDP) and
Form of Government – Gujarat (2000-2010)

Figure: Social Sector Expenditure as Percentage of Net State Domestic Income (NSDP) and
Form of Government – Haryana (2000-2010)
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Figure: Social Sector Expenditure as Percentage of Net State Domestic Income (NSDP) and
Form of Government – Karnataka (2000-2010)

Figure: Social Sector Expenditure as Percentage of Net State Domestic Income (NSDP) and
Form of Government – Kerala (2000-2010)
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Figure: Social Sector Expenditure as Percentage of Net State Domestic Income (NSDP) and
Form of Government – Madhya Pradesh (2000-2010)

Figure: Social Sector Expenditure as Percentage of Net State Domestic Income (NSDP) and
Form of Government – Maharashtra (2000-2010)
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Figure: Social Sector Expenditure as Percentage of Net State Domestic Income (NSDP) and
Form of Government – Orissa (2000-2010)

Figure: Social Sector Expenditure as Percentage of Net State Domestic Income (NSDP) and
Form of Government – Punjab (2000-2010)
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Figure: Social Sector Expenditure as Percentage of Net State Domestic Income (NSDP) and
Form of Government – Rajasthan (2000-2010)

Figure: Social Sector Expenditure as Percentage of Net State Domestic Income (NSDP) and
Form of Government – Tamil Nadu (2000-2010)
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Figure: Social Sector Expenditure as Percentage of Net State Domestic Income (NSDP) and
Form of Government – West Bengal (2000-2010)

Figure: Social Sector Expenditure as Percentage of Net State Domestic Income (NSDP) and
Form of Government – Uttar Pradesh (2000-2010)
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Figure: Social Sector Expenditure as Percentage of Net State Domestic Income (NSDP) and
Form of Government – Assam (2000-2010)
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